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The main institutional change of the EMU is clearly the constitution of a common cen-
tral bank (European Central Bank - ECB). Moreover, ﬁscal policies are now regulated
according to the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) established by the Euro-
pean Commission (EC) in 2000 and the decisions taken within the ECOFIN Council
of (Economics and Finance) Ministers (for the whole EU) and the Eurogroup (for the
EMU).1 For example, the ﬁscal policy of the EU Member States is monitored within the
framework of the BEPGs by the EC with recommendations, warnings, and judgements.
An example is the ECOFIN Council recommendation to Ireland on the 12th of February
2001, addressing the inconsistency between the Irish budget for 2001 and the BEPGs.
Other cases are the recommendations with early warnings by the EC for Germany and
Portugal on the 11th of February 2002 and more recently - on the 21st of January 2003
- for France. However, the institutions and the procedures for economic policy coor-
dination are far from being completely established, and, therefore, several matters are
still under discussion. Having this context in mind, this paper studies the institutional
design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within the EMU and
its consequences on macroeconomic outcomes and policies.
Fiscal policy coordination in a monetary union is directly linked to the sizes and signs
of the spillovers and externalities resulting from national ﬁscal policies. Fiscal spillovers
are crucial since they ultimately determine whether coordination should lead to a more
expansionary or a more restrictive ﬁscal stance in the member states. For example, if
governments perceive negative spillovers in a static game, they would interpret a non-
cooperative (“beggar-thy-neighbour”) policy in response to bad economic shocks as too
expansionary and would agree on a more restrictive stance in all countries. By contrast,
if governments perceive positive spillovers, coordination should eliminate free-riding be-
haviour of individual countries and promote more expansionary policy in response to
bad economic shocks. In a dynamic setting the situation is more complicated as the
size, persistence and signs of the spillovers may markedly change over time.
The EMU is clearly a highly integrated economic area with a large number of inter-
actions between the participating countries. However, empirical estimations of spillovers
in such a context are not (yet) available2 and the theoretical literature does not provide
a clear-cut answer about the sign of ﬁscal policy spillovers. The traditional argument in
favour of international policy coordination is based on direct positive demand spillovers.
By contrast, more recent, micro-founded models of the EMU tend to conclude in favour
of negative ﬁscal spillovers by emphasizing the adverse terms-of-trade eﬀects of balanced-
budget foreign ﬁscal expansion on the domestic economy. Furthermore, the possibility
of accumulating public debts might add other sources of negative spillovers through the
common nominal interest rate.
1The Eurogroup, however, is not oﬃcially institutionalized, but is an informal meeting of the Ministers
of Finance of the EMU-member states.
2A very preliminary attempt to estimate cross-country spillovers within the EMU is provided by
Monteforte and Siviero (2003). Moreover, Monfort et al. (2002) try to empirically disentangle common
shocks and spillover eﬀects in a multi-country setting.
2In the EMU a central role is played by the coordination of the ﬁscal policies among
the national governments3 and, moreover, their coordination with the monetary policy
of the ECB.4 In general, two kinds of coordination can be distinguished (Beetsma et al.
(2001)): institutional (or ex-ante) coordination, and policy (or ex-post) coordination.
The ex-ante coordination is related to the institutional framework, the coordination
procedures, and the design of policy rules, whereas ex-post coordination takes place
from the current state of aﬀairs and concerns the actual policy decisions. More in
particular, ex-ante coordination operates through formal binding agreements recognized
by the policymakers as international obligations (e.g. the Maastricht Treaty and the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)). By contrast, ex-post coordination has an informal
character, and refers to discretionary and ad hoc informal agreements stipulated among
the countries.5 The two kinds of coordination are strictly interconnected. In fact, e.g.,
the SGP might strongly reduce the room for discretionary coordination of the national
ﬁscal policies. Similarly, discretionary agreements among the countries might depend
on the design of the European institutions concerning ﬁscal cooperation as e.g. the
ECOFIN Council.
The institutional framework (ex-ante coordination) is introduced by considering dif-
ferent rules, procedures and information shared among policymakers, which taken to-
gether characterize the negotiations among policymakers in determining cooperation
agreements. Diﬀerent institutional settings may have diﬀerent eﬀects on the implemen-
tation of cooperative policies. In fact, some institutional setups may not be able to
promote cooperation, even when cooperative policies increase the welfare of policymak-
ers because of free-riding behaviour.
Ex-post coordination will be studied in a dynamic framework to emphasize the dy-
namic character of both direct and indirect spillovers arising from the behaviour of
national ﬁscal policies in an integrated area as the EMU. The direct spillovers from ﬁs-
cal policies result from the eﬀect of domestic output on foreign output via the export
channel. The indirect spillovers result from the eﬀects of ﬁscal policies on the dynamics
of inﬂation rates, intra-EMU competitiveness, and interest rates.
Our paper extends the literature in two respects.
(a) From the methodological point of view, this paper extends Di Bartolomeo et al.
(2004) by considering a more general shock structure - based on inﬂa t i o ni n s t e a do f
competitiveness - in the model dynamics. Moreover, more general inﬂation dynam-
3Inﬂation bias, which may arise in the setting of ﬁscal policy, is likely to be stronger in a multi-country
monetary union with nationally-set ﬁscal policies than in the case of EMU-wide set ﬁscal policies. It is
important, therefore, to design institutions for commitment and coordination of ﬁscal policies in order
to mitigate such biases (CESifo (2002, Chapter 3)).
4Also some global interdependencies, primarily with the USA, can be important. See Neck et al.
(2002) for the study of policy coordination in a global context.
5As it is pointed out by Beetsma et al. (2001), we can think of the Eurogroup,i nw h i c ht h eF i n a n c e
Ministers of the EMU-area discuss ﬁscal policies in an informal way, as a forum of ex-post co-ordination.
Furthermore, also the ECOFIN Council, notwithstanding its more formal nature, is characterized by
largely discretionary decisions and can, therefore, be interpreted as a formal institution where not only
formal but also informal agreements take place.
3ics are considered: the eﬀects of foreign inﬂation rates are included, as suggested
by the recent open economies’ literature.6
(b) In this paper we also extend the current literature on the institutional design (ex-
ante coordination) of the EMU by taking account of a dynamic framework. After
solving the n-country model analytically according to the linear-quadratic method-
ology, we expose the main features of our model by numerical simulations based on
structural form parameters. In the numerical simulations, we will analyze the con-
sequences of ex-ante and ex-post policy coordination under diﬀerent assumptions
on the sign and size of the ﬁscal spillovers, and on the asymmetries among the
EMU Member States. The diﬀerent forms of asymmetry that will be investigated
are: countries having asymmetric structural model parameters (structural asym-
metry), policymakers having diﬀerent preferences (preference asymmetry), and,
ﬁnally, shocks that asymmetrically hit countries (shock asymmetry).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a small dynamic macroeco-
nomic model of the EMU economy and the dynamic stabilization problem the ﬁscal
policymakers and the common monetary authority are facing. Section 3 discusses in
detail the institutional aspects of policy coordination in the EMU context and how these
aspects are incorporated into our analysis. Section 4 analyzes the consequences of ex-
post and ex-ante policy coordination in a dynamic framework by studying numerical
simulations of various examples.
2 The basic economic framework
In this section we describe our basic framework. We consider a model where n countries
( ¯ N := {1,2...n}) participate in a monetary union. Each economy is described by an
aggregate demand/IS curve and an aggregate supply curve (derived from a Phillips
relationship). All the variables are in logarithms, except for the interest rate which
is in perunages, and denote deviations from their long-run equilibrium that has been
normalized to zero, for simplicity. A dot above a variable denotes its time derivative.
Equations (1) are the IS curves which represent the aggregate demand (AD) in each
of the EMU countries as a function of competitiveness in intra-EMU trade, the domestic
real interest rate, the foreign real output gaps, and the domestic real ﬁscal deﬁcit. Hence,
the aggregate demand satisﬁes:






δij [pj(t) − pi(t)] (1)
in which x denotes the real output gap (deﬁned as real output relative to potential real
output7), f the real ﬁscal deﬁcit, p the price level, and iE the common nominal interest
6Evidence of foreign inﬂation eﬀects on the Phillips curve is provided by DiNardo and Moore (1999).
See also Razin and Yuen (2001) and Plasmans et al. (2004).
7In this paper, it is assumed that the equilibrium real output gap has been normalized to zero for
convenience (as for all the other variables).
4rate in the EMU area. The (expected) real interest rate is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the nominal common interest rate and the inﬂation in a country. Although the
nominal interest rate is the same for the whole Euro area, real interest rates diverge
among countries if inﬂation rates are diﬀerent.
Equations (2) are open economy Phillips curves, which describe the aggregate supply




ςij ˙ pj(t) , pi(0) = pi0 (2)
Aggregate supply is assumed to be determined by a Phillips curve implied by the
existence of some (nominal) rigidities in the goods (and/or labour) markets giving rise
to a short-run trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and output. In this Phillips relationship the
inﬂation rates of the other countries play a role since foreign inﬂation is passed through
via domestic imports of foreign intermediate goods and also via the possibility that
domestic wage claims rise, given the presence of a real wage wedge. In accordance
with our short-run stabilization focus, the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal policy is limited to its
transitory impact on the output gap through the induced stimulus of the aggregate
demand. The initial values of domestic prices represent (initial) supply/cost shocks that
hit the economy at time zero.
Within the above economic framework, we assume that the ﬁscal authorities control
their ﬁscal policy instrument such as to minimize the following quadratic loss function,8
which features domestic inﬂation, real output gap, and real ﬁscal deﬁcit, with respect to










in which θ denotes the rate of time preference and αi, βi, and χi represent preference
weights that are attached to the stabilization of inﬂation, output, and ﬁscal discipline,
respectively (in general, βi >α i). In particular, parameter χi is an indicator for the
stringency of the rules imposed by the SGP. A higher value of χi in this interpretation
means that the SGP is more strictly interpreted and high deﬁcits bear high costs.
We choose the EMU wide nominal interest rate as the ECB’s monetary policy in-
strument and add an interest rate smoothing objective in the ECB’s cost function, to
express the ECB’s caution in setting monetary policy. Consequently, we assume that













8Note that the quadratic form of the loss function implies that policymakers are equally concerned
about inﬂation and deﬂation and about a negative output gap vs. a positive one. This may not always
be realistic; however, such an assumption is necessary to keep the analysis more tractable.
5where ˙ pu ≡
Pn
i=1 σi ˙ pi is aggregate inﬂation; xu ≡
Pn
i=1 σixi is loglinearized aggregate
output;9 αECB and βECB indicate the relative preferences of the ECB concerning inﬂa-
tion and output of the EMU as a whole. Parameter σi indicates the relative weight of
country i in the euro zone (
n P
i=1
σi =1 ) . The minimization of this loss function w.r.t. iu(t)
is consistent with the derivation of a standard monetary policy rule (see e.g. Clarida et
al. (1999)), since it results in a linear function in its arguments.


















where x(t) is a country-ordered vector of output gaps, ˙ p(t) is a country-ordered vector of
inﬂation rates, p(t) and f(t) are the price level and ﬁscal deﬁcit vectors, respectively.11





indicates the elasticities of the real output
gap and inﬂation rate with respect to price levels and control instruments. The upper
part of matrix L ∈ IR 2n×(2n+1) indicates the instantaneous elasticities of the real output
gaps. The lower part of this matrix indicates the elasticities of the inﬂation dynamics of
the model. The matrix L is crucial in the analysis of the externalities. More in detail,
the matrix E ∈ IR n×n describes the eﬀects of the domestic ﬁscal policy on the domestic
real output gaps (main diagonal elements) and those of the foreign ﬁscal policies on the
domestic real output gaps (oﬀ-diagonal elements); the latter elasticities are called ﬁscal
externalities. Similarly, the matrix B ∈ IR n×n describes the eﬀects of the ﬁscal policy
variables on the inﬂation rates. Matrices D ∈ IR n×n and A ∈ IR n×n indicate the eﬀects
of domestic and foreign price levels on the domestic real output gaps and inﬂation rates,
respectively. Vectors M ∈ IR n and N ∈ IR n are the semi-elasticities of the real output
gaps and inﬂation rates w.r.t. to the common nominal interest rate.
3 Institutional setup and cooperative mechanisms
The current policy framework of the EMU presents a strong asymmetry between the
management of ﬁscal and monetary policies. The common monetary policy is deter-
9The following two-country example illustrates the procedure of loglinearization. Assuming that the
real output Xi(t) is in the neighbourhood of the steady state output ¯ Xi, the following approximation
holds:
Xi(t)





Xu(t) and by rules of loglinearization transformed into 1 '
¯ X1
¯ Xu (1 + x1(t) − xu(t)) +
¯ X2
¯ Xu (1 + x2(t) − xu(t)). Simplifying we obtain: xu(t) ≡ log
Xu(t)





¯ Xu are relative weights of the countries’ output. Hence, it follows that xu(t) is the aggregate
output gap.
10For the derivation of the reduced form of the model refer to the Appendix (see footnote 7).
11Clearly, the dimension of all these vectors is n.
6mined by a supranational policymaker (the ECB) with a statutory primary objective,
achieving and maintaining price stability in the EMU area. By contrast, ﬁscal policies
remain in the hands of the EMU Member States, with no objective speciﬁed by the
Treaty but constrained by the SGP requirements. This decentralized management of
the ﬁscal policies raises several issues on the need of ex-post coordination among mem-
ber governments and the eventual alternative mechanisms that can guarantee ex-ante
coordination.12
The ex-ante coordination among ﬁscal policymakers can be implemented according
to positive or negative mechanisms. In the EU positive ﬁscal coordination is barely
used with the exception of the BEPGs, which, however, are formally non-binding. By
contrast, the SGP, which is a negative coordination mechanism punishing countries
running excessive public deﬁcits, constitutes the core of the EMU architecture. The SGP
allows the ECB to “play on the safe side” by putting a strong limit to the discretional
power of the national governments in setting their independent ﬁscal policies (Onorante
(2002)).
In the ongoing debate, it is argued that increased coordination should include 1)
a greater sharing of information among the member states; 2) a greater positive co-
ordination; and 3) a progressive reduction of the importance of negative (rule based)
coordination.13
In this paper the institutional design issue and ex-ante positive coordination are intro-
duced by assuming that policymakers, who face a stabilization problem in the EMU, play
a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage (the coalition game) they decide non-cooperatively
whether or not to coordinate their ﬁscal policies after that common or country-speciﬁc
shocks have been observed. In the second stage (the stabilization game) they play a non-
cooperative dynamic game, where those policymakers, who have signed the agreement,
play as a single player sharing a common loss function. The rules of the ﬁrst-stage game
determine the institutional setup (ex-ante coordination), whereas the second stage of the
game describes ex-post coordination. According to the rules determined in the institu-
tional coordination negotiations, diﬀerent coalition structures may emerge when ex-post
coordination is considered. Negative coordination is determined by the magnitude of
the costs associated with the ﬁscal stance prescribed by the SGP.
Unfortunately, game theory is far from having achieved a well deﬁned non-cooperative
theory of coalition formation. There are, however, a few diﬀerent stability concepts that
can be used to model endogenous coalition formation in solving the coalition game (ﬁrst
stage). In fact, according to Ecchia and Mariotti (1998), diﬀerent equilibrium concepts
c a nb es e e na sd i ﬀerent institutional contexts where policymakers act. Hence, diﬀerent
equilibria can be used to derive indications about optimal institutional design of the
EMU. Such an approach can be of a particular interest in the current European debate
on the institutional design of the EMU (see Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2003)).
12Although several studies have investigated the eﬀects of (needs for) ﬁscal and/or monetary co-
ordination, only a few have challenged the issue of the mechanism of co-ordination by comparing alter-
native schemes (see e.g. van Aarle et al. (2002a) and Onorante (2002)).
13These guidelines are however not fully agreed. For example, Uhlig (2002) claims that the SGP needs
strengthening rather than weakening (so he calls for an increase of negative co-ordination).
7We consider four possible candidate equilibrium concepts for the ﬁrst stage of the
game: Coalitional Nash Equilibrium (CNE), Farsighted Coalitional Equilibrium (FCE),
Sequential Negotiation Equilibrium (SNE) and Sequential Negotiation Game Equilibrium
(SNGE).
The ﬁrst one is based on the standard Nash equilibrium concept and was introduced
into the coalition literature by the seminal studies of d’Aspremont et al. (1983).14
CNE is the result of a one-shot game where agents simultaneously face the problem
of accepting or rejecting a proposal that consists in sharing their loss function and
cooperatively setting their instruments. After that all agents’ decisions are taken, the
CNE is formed.15
Regarding FCE, we consider the possibility of reaching ﬁnal decisions about the co-
ordination on the basis of a sequentially repeated negotiation process that ends when
there are no further opportunities of gains for the players. FCE is based on the idea of
indirect domination, which implies farsightedness (see e.g. Chwe (1994) and Mariotti
(1998)). The indirect domination concept captures the idea that each agent (or coalition
of agents), who deviates from a given coalition structure, has anticipated further devia-
tions of other agents. Speciﬁcally, this equilibrium implies that member states and the
ECB are able to forecast the reactions of (the) other policymakers to their actions. We
solve the FCE-game assuming that no player can refuse the proposal to play coopera-
tively (open-membership assumption) and no group deviations are possible. Diﬀerently
from the other stability concepts, a deviation is possible even if it does not improve
(immediately) the utility of the deviating agent. In fact, an agent can strategically de-
viate to induce the other players to take actions that in the end will lead her to a stable
coalition structure where she gets a higher payoﬀ. An algorithm that helps to ﬁnd FCEs
is reported in the Appendix.
The last two coalition formation mechanisms, SNGE and SNE, are based on the
assumption that decisions about ﬁscal policies are determined by the national govern-
ments and that coordination is built on the basis of a hierarchical sequential negotiation
process.16 These mechanisms emphasize the possib l er o l ep l a y e db ys i n g l ec o u n t r i e si n
the negotiation for achieving a coordination agreement, e.g. that with the temporary
EU President Country. In this case, the EU Presidency determines a list of proponents
(list of order) among the ministers of the member countries, and then each minister,
according to this list of order, proposes a coalition to a group of countries. Countries
that accept a proposal exit from the game. The ﬁnal result of such a negotiation scheme
under the assumption of perfect information is an SNGE. In the Appendix we describe
an algorithm for the computation of a unique SNGE. This mechanism has, however,
14Several variants of this concept are surveyed in Carraro and Siniscalco (1998).
15See Carraro (1998) or van Aarle et al (2002b) for a more detailed deﬁnition of the CNE equilibrium.
16Inspired by Bloch (1996) and Ray and Vohra (1999) we deﬁne an SNGE as a hierarchical multi-stage
negotiation process (the algorithm is presented in the Appendix, see footnote 7). The main modiﬁcation
of Bloch (1996) is that every coalition can be proposed only once. In the SNE, diﬀerently from SNGE,
we assume that players instead of acting strategically have bounded rationality. When they decide to
propose, accept or reject a coalition they look at the immediate consequence of their choice, not taking
the further choices of other players into account.
8several drawbacks. The most important of them is that the outcome can depend on
the list of order. Hence, various questions concerning institutions and procedures arise:
e.g. who determines that list since the list of order can be chosen strategically as to
determine a possible coalition? Availability of perfect information can rarely be a case
in a real-world monetary union. The SNE-mechanism is a model for an institutionalized
decision-making process that might be used in the situation when players know only
o w nl o s s e si nd i ﬀerent coalition structures and when they are risk-averse. We assume
that in such a situation all the players agree to use certain standardized procedures of
negotiations that can be to some extent compared to the SNGE-rules. Formally, the
diﬀerence is that the SNE-equilibrium is found not via backward induction, like in the
case of the SNGE, but using a procedure based on the well known minimax concept.
4 Numerical solutions of the model
In our model diﬀerent forms of asymmetry can be considered: countries may have asym-
metric structural model parameters (model asymmetry), policymakers may have diﬀerent
preferences (preference asymmetry), policymakers may have diﬀerent bargaining pow-
ers in negotiating cooperative agreements (power asymmetry) and, ﬁnally, shocks may
asymmetrically hit countries (shock asymmetry).
By analyzing the diﬀerent cases of asymmetries, we may compare some conclusions
of Buti and Sapir (1998) and Beetsma et al. (2001), but now in a dynamic and possi-
bly asymmetric model setting. Buti and Sapir (1998) argue that ﬁscal coordination is
desirable when large symmetric shocks are present, while Beetsma et al. (2001) argue
that ﬁscal coordination is desirable when there are asymmetric shocks, because ﬁscal
authorities can internalize the spillovers connected with opposite ﬁscal policies.
4.1 Symmetric baseline models
The baseline parameters used in the simulations are listed in Table 1. Although coun-
tries are assumed to be symmetric with respect to all the structural form parameters,
policymakers’ preferences are not symmetric. The ECB’s preference diﬀers from that of
the (identical) national governments (preference asymmetry). The ECB puts a larger
weight on inﬂation stabilization than output gap stabilization. Fiscal players, on the
other hand, are more concerned with output gap stabilization than inﬂation (rate) sta-
bilization. As explained earlier, the ECB objectives concern EMU aggregate output gap
and inﬂation while the ﬁscal players are only concerned about domestic output gap and
inﬂation. Results from various empirical studies on the euro area suggest e.g. that the
interest rate elasticity of output (γi) lies in the range 0.1 to 0.3 (e.g. Angeloni et al.
(2002) ﬁnd a value of 0.19), that the instantaneous multiplier of ﬁscal policy (ηi)i sb e -
tween 0.5 and 1 (European Commission (2001) uses a value of 0.5 in its model), that the
competitiveness eﬀect (δij) and the elasticity w.r.t. foreign output gap (ρij)a r es o m e -
where around 0.2 and 0.3, respectively (Hooper et al. (1998)). Considerable evidence
also exists for the property that the output gap elasticity in the Phillips curve (ζi)i sr e l -
9atively small (Smets (2000) estimates a value of 0.18) and that there is some eﬀect from
foreign inﬂation rates (ςij )( L a x t o net al. (1998)). For the symmetric baseline model we
will consider two cases: the ﬁrst base scenario (BS1) with a high elasticity w.r.t. foreign
output, ρij = ρ =0 .4,r e ﬂecting strongly interdependent economies in terms of output
gap, and the second base scenario (BS2) with ρij = ρ =0 .2, characterized by weakly
interdependent economies.
Table 1 — Baseline parameters (i,j ∈ {1,2,3},i6= j)17
ηi =1 δij =0 .2 γi =0 .2 ζi =0 .3 ρij =0 .4 ςij =0 .1
αi =0 .2 βi =0 .4 χi =0 .15 αECB =0 .4 βECB =0 .2 χECB =0 .15
Given the parameters of Table 1, the matrix of reduced form coeﬃcients in this





) equals (the theoretical reduced form
coeﬃcients are derived in the Appendix):
L(1) =






















     

Since E(1) and B(1) c o n t a i no n l yp o s i t i v eo ﬀ-diagonal elements, the setting is char-
acterized by positive ﬁscal externalities on the real output gaps (i.e. increases in the
domestic ﬁscal deﬁcit raise foreign output gaps) and negative ﬁscal externalities on the
inﬂation rates (i.e. increases in the domestic ﬁscal deﬁcit raise foreign inﬂation). More-
over, increases of domestic ﬁscal expenditures raise both the domestic real output gaps
and inﬂation rates.
The matrix L(2) is computed for BS2 (with ρ =0 .2 instead of ρ =0 .4). It turns
out that the parameter ρ has a crucial eﬀect on the elasticities in the submatrices E(2),
B(2),M (2) and N(2). All elements of L(2) h a v et h es a m es i g na si nL(1). However, the
values in matrices E(2) and B(2) are substantially lower, which indicates that ﬁscal
players’ instruments have much less inﬂuence on real output gaps and inﬂation. Also
the inﬂuence of the interest rate is limited compared with that in BS1 (matrices M and
N). This relative importance of ρ is not accidental as this parameter describes foreign
output gap spillovers, which indirectly but to a large extent depend on foreign ﬁscal
instruments, boosting their eﬀects. The value of ρ is therefore crucial in determining
the foreign ﬁscal spillovers, which explains the relatively big diﬀerences between the
matrices L(1) and L(2), and consequently between losses in both scenarios. Note also that
spillovers spread themselves out of the entire monetary union through trade channels.
17In all the simulations we have used symmetric bargaining powers and a discount rate (θ)e q u a lt o
0.1. Robustness of the results has been tested by many additional non-reported numerical simulations
available upon request.
10In fact through secondary round initial spillovers will eventually return to the country
of their origin as other countries start to import more as a result of the initial positive




























4.2 Common Price Shock
We ﬁrst consider a common price shock (p0 =[ 0 .1,0.1,0.1]
0)t h a th i t st h ew h o l eE M U
area (with an equal size). Optimal losses for BS1 are described in Table 2.18
Table 2 - BS1. Optimal losses for a common shock (multiplied by 108)
ρ =0 .4 NC C F (1,2) (1,3) (2,3)
Country 1 24.7620 24.6479 24.7708 24.7755 24.7755 24.7487
Country 2 24.7620 24.6479 24.7708 24.7755 24.7487 24.7755
Country 3 24.7620 24.6479 24.7708 24.7487 24.7755 24.7755
ECB 54.1579 48.0783 54.5365 54.3463 54.3463 54.3463
The only regime that results in optimal losses that are lower than those associated
with the non-cooperative case is the full coordination solution (grand coalition C)b e -
tween ﬁscal and monetary authorities (in more technical terms, full coordination is the
only proﬁtable regime). All forms of ﬁscal coordination are associated with negative
performances (i.e. coalition members have losses higher than those that they achieve
in the complete non-cooperative regime); hence, these coalitions are non-proﬁtable. In
this symmetric case, partial coordination of ﬁscal policies has a negative eﬀect: partial
coordination tends to aggravate the conﬂict with the excluded ﬁscal player and the ECB.
It is easily veriﬁed that all the coalitional equilibriums coincide and that the full coop-
erative case C is the single equilibrium; hence, CNE=SNE=SNGE=FCE= C.T a b l e3
describes the optimal losses for BS2. Compared with BS1, full cooperation is no longer
the ﬁr s tb e s tc h o i c ef o rt h eﬁscal players, who would prefer to exclude the ECB from the
full coalition in order to create the ﬁscal regime F. To better understand the reasons
behind this change it is useful to study the macroeconomic adjustments of relevant vari-
ables presented in Figure 1 (both base scenarios under a common price shock). Panel
(a) shows the non-cooperative regime and panel (b) the full cooperative case (because
of the symmetry only the results for one country are reported).
18NC indicates the non-co-operative regime, C the full-co-operation regime, F the coalition between
all the ﬁscal authorities, and terms between brackets denote partial coalitions among ﬁscal authorities.
11Table 3 - BS2. Optimal losses for a common shock (multiplied by 108)
ρ =0 .2 NC C F (1,2) (1,3) (2,3)
Country 1 24.5853 24.6741 24.5818 24.5865 24.5865 24.5766
Country 2 24.5853 24.6741 24.5818 24.5865 24.5766 24.5865
Country 3 24.5853 24.6741 24.5818 24.5766 24.5865 24.5865
ECB 49.0913 48.1967 48.9489 49.0247 49.0247 49.0247
Observing a common price shock, ﬁscal authorities try to improve competitiveness
vis-à-vis the other countries with restrictive ﬁscal policies, but since all the countries
f o l l o wt h es a m ep o l i c yt h eﬁnal losses in the non-cooperative regime are higher than in
the cooperative one for BS1. Therefore, non-cooperative ﬁscal policies tend to induce
a recession, and the ECB reacts by cutting the nominal interest rate to stimulate the
economies. The diﬀerent losses between the two regimes are mainly associated with the
diﬀerent management of the policies. Output gaps and inﬂation rates adjust practically
in the same manner, but policy strategies are largely diﬀerent. In the non-cooperative
regime, in fact, ﬁscal authorities tend to neutralize mutual eﬀects on competitiveness,
whereas the ECB tends to neutralize the deﬂationary and recessive eﬀects of ﬁscal poli-
cies.19 In the cooperative regime all policymakers internalize the negative externalities
from their policy management. The cooperative regime disciplines the management of
the ﬁscal policies so that countries pursue moderate ﬁscal expansions and end up with
small deﬁcits.
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(a) Non-cooperative regime (NC)



































(b) Full cooperation (C)
In BS2 both ﬁscal and monetary policies are more moderate in the non-cooperative
regime, compared to BS1. The policies of ﬁscal players are in the non-cooperative regime
19With a (symmetric) positive price shock (p0 =[ 0 .1,0.1,0.1]
0) ﬁscal policy is restrictive (a surplus)
and monetary policy is expansionary (a negative interest-rate diﬀerential), while with a (symmetric)
negative price shock (p0 =[ −0.1,−0.1,−0.1]
0), we have the same (optimal) losses but with opposite
policies: a restrictive monetary policy and an expansionary ﬁscal policy. In the latter case there is an
expenditure bias that can be reduced by co-ordinating ﬁscal policies.
12more moderate than in the full cooperative one so that losses become in the latter case
higher than in the former one. Therefore, full cooperation is not any longer an equilib-
rium for any of the mechanisms considered. It is worth noticing that there is almost no
diﬀerence in output gaps and price adjustments between BS1 and BS2. It means that
diﬀerences in losses are to a great extent induced by diﬀerences in stabilization policies.
In other words an increased control eﬀort in the non-cooperative regime just leads to
higher negative ﬁscal spillovers. This is a strong argument in favour of coordination.
The strong diﬀerence between BS1 and BS2 is not accidental. Robustness analysis in
this symmetric setting shows that, indeed, parameter ρ is crucial in the case of a symmet-
ric price shock. For more interdependent economies in terms of output (lower value of
ρ). full cooperation is more proﬁtable than non-cooperation. However, when economies
are relatively less interdependent in terms of output the outcome for ﬁscal players is
opposite. One dimensional variations of other parameters do not aﬀect substantially the
above result.
In the above numerical simulations we have mainly discussed ex-post policy coordi-
nation. However, the complex situation which emerged in Table 3 suggests that also
diﬀerent forms of ex-ante coordination should be studied. In fact, ﬁscal policy coordi-
nation (F) assures for all ﬁscal players better results than those for the non-cooperative
regime (NC). However, F is not a CNE as it is neither externally nor internally stable.
The ECB has an incentive to join the ﬁscal coalition (lack of external stability) and each
ﬁscal player has an incentive to deviate and play as a singleton when the other two ﬁscal
players are in partial coalition (lack of internal stability). No other regime turns out to
be a CNE of this game, consequently players act non-cooperatively.
Since the NC-solution is Pareto-inferior with respect to ﬁscal cooperation F,i ti s
interesting to look for diﬀerent mechanisms that support coordination. The ineﬃciency
that emerges from Table 3 follows from the mechanism considered in the coalition for-
mation and may be eliminated under diﬀerent procedures. The institutional cooperative
design, in which policymakers act, determines the rules of the coalition formation process
(Ecchia and Mariotti (1998)). For instance, using the algorithm for the SNGE (to be
found in the Appendix) the resulting equilibrium will be the desired ﬁscal coordination
(F) since each proponent (countries 1,2,3) has an incentive to propose this coalition -
it is the only one that will be accepted by the other countries as a better solution than
non-cooperation. In addition countries know that there is no possibility that a partial
coalition emerges as an ultimate equilibrium; therefore, they are aware that any non-
cooperative strategy would end up in the NC-regime. In this example we also have that
SNE = FCE = F. On the other hand, a mechanism implying the FCE requires more
information than the one supporting the SNGE or the CNE. For instance, the FCE is not
compatible with an non-transparent central bank or with an environment where credi-
ble information about the state of the economies is not available. If the member states
themselves have to provide information about their economy they could try to use this
information strategically, and, therefore, this is incompatible with the FCE institutional
design (a similar observation can be made for information provided by the ECB).
13This example indicates that, even when coordination gains are present, cooperative
solutions do not necessarily emerge as an equilibrium of the game. Diﬀerent institutional
designs (ex-ante coordination) imply diﬀerent equilibriums. Therefore, rules, procedures
and available information are sometimes crucial to improve cooperative solutions and to
raise the welfare of all the policymakers by avoiding a free-riding behaviour.
Note that the above analysis matches the case studied by Buti and Sapir (1998),
where a common (price) shock is applied. The results obtained for BS2 conﬁrm their
conclusion that in the case of a common symmetric shock ﬁscal coordination emerges
as an equilibrium. However, for relatively more integrated economies (as in BS1) full
cooperation turns out to be optimal. Hence, both the degree of integration and the
symmetric character of the shock determines the scope for cooperation.
4.3 Anti-Symmetric Shock
We consider a country-speciﬁcp r i c es h o c kt h a ta ﬀects the prices in countries 1 and 3
in an opposite manner (an anti-symmetric country-speciﬁcs h o c k ,p0 =[ 0 .1,0,−0.1]
0).
Optimal losses for the various regimes in BS1 are reported in Table 4.20 Optimal losses
presented in Table 4 are multiplied by a factor 106, therefore they are much higher than
those in Tables 2 and 3. These diﬀerences are by far higher than the diﬀerences between
BS1 and BS2, where model parameters are changed. This indicates that in our model
the nature of the shock is much more important than structural asymmetries on the
competitiveness parameter ρ.
Table 4 — Optimal losses for country-speciﬁc shock (multiplied by 106)
NC C F (1,2) (1,3) (2,3)
Country 1 16.1105 8.0582 8.0582 10.2819 8.0582 17.1070
Country 2 00 0 2 .6283 0 2.6283
Country 3 16.1105 8.0582 8.0582 17.1070 8.0582 10.2819
ECB 00 0 0 .0430 0 0.0430
The most evident feature of Table 4 is that there are no diﬀerences in optimal losses
between the grand coalition C,t h eﬁscal coalition F, and the partial coalition (1,3).
This occurs because the ﬁscal policy of the ﬁrst country is exactly oﬀset by the ﬁscal
policy of the third country, due to the model symmetry and the preference symmetry
among ﬁscal authorities.21 More in detail, in regimes where countries 1 and 3 are either
both in the same coalition or both outside, due to the equal sizes of the perfectly opposite
shocks, the ECB and country 2 do not aﬀect the dynamics of the game since changes
in the common nominal interest rate equally aﬀect all the prices and output gaps. This
changes when partial ﬁscal coalitions with country 2 are formed, even in this symmetric
setting. With the partial ﬁscal coalitions (1,2) and (2,3) all the players, including the
ECB, are directly aﬀected in their optimal policies and losses. Coalitions including both
20The results for the BS2 are comparable to those for BS1, we report and discuss only the ﬁrst baseline.
21See van Aarle et al. (2002a) for a more detailed description of this mechanism in a two-country
model.
14countries 1 and 3 are clearly equilibriums of the game since they correspond to the ﬁrst
best strategies for all the players. Hence, FCE=SNGE=SNE= C and the Rational
Feasible Coalitions set of FCE = C,F,(1,3).22
Figure 2 shows the paths of the control variables after the country-speciﬁcs h o c kf o r
BS1 and BS2. The results for BS2 are similar to those of BS1.
Figure 2






























(a) Non-co-operative regime (NC)





























Like in the case of a common price shock/supply shock, non-cooperative policies are
less active in BS2 than BS1, whereas in the case of cooperation the opposite occurs. In
contrast to the common shock case, the outcome of the coalition formation process does
not change between BS1 and BS2. Figure 2 shows that symmetries have a neutralizing
eﬀect and tend to compensate the eﬀects of the policymakers’ actions. Therefore, coop-
eration helps in reducing the losses from too expansionary (restrictive) ﬁscal policies: in
the cooperative case country 1 has a smaller deﬁcit and country 3 a smaller surplus than
in the non-cooperative case. In this way negative ﬁscal externalities are internalized and,
therefore, partially reduced. Because of the perfect structural symmetry of the model,
country 2 and the ECB are not aﬀected at all by the anti-symmetric shocks in country
1a n d3 .
The asymmetric country-speciﬁcs h o c ka n a l y z e di nT a b l e4i st h ec a s ew h i c hB e e t s m a
et al. (2001) analyze and ﬁnd that ﬁscal coordination is desirable. We conﬁrm their result:
ﬁscal authorities internalize the negative eﬀects of opposite policies with coordination.
But, we also ﬁnd that, in this symmetric setting, no further gains are associated with
full cooperation C,w h i c hi sc o n ﬁrmed by Figure 2 (no more eﬀects to internalize).
22The full coalition C is the sole SNGE as it is assumed according to the algorithm in the Appendix
that in the case of equal losses players will choose that coalition which contains the highest number of
players. A similar reasoning can be applied for the FCE, where it is assumed that in the case where the
Rational Feasible Coalitions set consists of more than one regime, the players will look for an exogenous
system to choose the ﬁnal coalition (see the algorithm to compute SNE, SNGE and FCE in the Appendix
available on internet (see footnote 7)).
15The above examples seem to advocate a need for coordination. We can distinguish
two cases. First, when a common price shock is considered, full coordination or ﬁscal
coordination of policies is required to internalize the externalities arising from excessive
spendings. Second, when anti-symmetric country-speciﬁc shocks occur, coordination
needs become weaker since only ﬁscal coordination among those countries that are hit
by the shocks, is needed. Third, in the case of asymmetric shocks (not shown) the room
for cooperation is further reduced as there is even more diﬀerence in the optimal policies
from the perspective of the country aﬀected by the shock and the other countries that
do not experience such a shock.
Negotiation mechanisms and their outcomes are clear in the above example. However,
less trivial cases may arise when more asymmetries are considered.
4.4 Structural Asymmetric Setting
The parameters of Table 5 can be interpreted as a setup where a relatively closed country
(country 1) faces two relatively open countries that are relatively more sensitive to foreign
output and price changes. In such a context we consider the following country-speciﬁc
price shock: p1(0) = 0.1, p2(0) = 0.075 ,a n dp3(0) = 0.05.
Table 5 — An example of a structural asymmetric setting
η1 =1 δ12 =0 .1 γ1 =0 .2 ζ1 =0 .3 ρ12 =0 .3 ς12 =0
η2 =1 δ13 =0 .1 γ2 =0 .2 ζ2 =0 .3 ρ13 =0 .3 ς13 =0
η3 =1 δ21 =0 .3 γ3 =0 .2 ζ3 =0 .3 ρ21 =0 .5 ς21 =0 .2
δ23 =0 .3 ρ23 =0 .5 ς23 =0 .1
δ31 =0 .3 ρ31 =0 .5 ς31 =0 .2
δ32 =0 .3 ρ32 =0 .5 ς32 =0 .1
The asymmetries imply that spillovers are not longer symmetric across the monetary
union. This is also seen in the matrix (L3) which corresponds to Table 5. It features
asymmetric positive ﬁscal spillovers for output gaps and inﬂa t i o nr a t e sa n dam i x e d
(asymmetric positive/negative) pattern of price spillovers. Also elasticity of output gap
and inﬂation w.r.t. interest rate is asymmetric:
L3 =






















     

The resulting optimal losses are describ e di nT a b l e6 . C o u n t r y3h a sb yf a rt h e
highest losses in all regimes, whereas country 2 has the lowest (except in the partial
coalition (2,3)). As countries 2 and 3 are identical, an explanation of these outcomes
is to be found in the asymmetry of the shocks and the diﬀerent adjustment dynamics
16produced by them. Due to the assumed price shock p0 =[ 0 .1,0.075,0.05]
0 country 1 has
a comparative price disadvantage w.r.t. to countries 2 and 3. This causes a relatively
high instability in output, especially for country 3, which is an inﬂation importer. More-
over, the common monetary policy is based on an aggregate macroeconomic variable,
hence it tends to stabilize the average. Therefore, its policy is more in line with the
situation in country 2 which shock is the closest to the average. Moreover, for country
2 externalities of countries 1 and 3 tend to compensate each other to a large extent.
Consequently this player features the lowest losses (except in the regime (2,3) in spite
of the fact that its shock is larger than the shock incurred by country 3. When country
2 creates a partial ﬁscal coalition with country 3, it will follow the policy optimal for
the coalition. Consequently for country 2 this policy will be less in line with the ECB
money management, what explains its relatively high loss in this regime.
Table 6 — Asymmetric economic structure and country-speciﬁcs h o c k 23
NC C F (1,2) (1,3) (2,3)
Country 1 0.4305 0.5041 0.5203 0.3830 0.5848 0.4693
Country 2 0.1621 0.1810 0.1977 0.1563 0.1442 0.5383
Country 3 1.9440 0.9378 0.9824 1.9253 1.0272 1.3843
ECB 0.2695 0.2982 0.2931 0.2710 0.2915 0.2722
As far as coalition formation mechanisms are concerned there is no CNE. Only for
country 3, ﬁscal and full cooperation is better than non-cooperation. Partial ﬁscal
cooperation (1,2) is proﬁtable for ﬁscal players (with respect to NC), however it is not
externally stable as country 3 has an incentive to join and create the ﬁscal coalition
regime F. Other partial ﬁscal coalitions (1,3) and (2,3) do not meet the proﬁtability
condition. On the other hand, in the farsighted FCE-mechanism the regime (1,2) emerges
as an equilibrium. It comes from the fact that country 3, being aware that the ﬁnal
outcome of its deviation is the non-proﬁtable regime NC, does not want to join the
coalition (1,2). Also, for any order of proposal both the SNE and the SNGE result in
the coalition (1,2). Figure 3 displays the adjustments of control and output variables
in the non-cooperative and (1,2) regimes. Under non-cooperation (left-hand panel),
country 1 has an expansionary policy since its output declines due to the unfavourable
terms of trade and highest price shock, whereas country 3 pursues a comparatively very
restrictive ﬁscal policy, as an inﬂation importer. Country 2 is somewhere in between, with
initially pursuing a restrictive ﬁscal policy, that eventually turns into an expansionary
one. Graphs in the right-hand side panel of Figure 3 present the diﬀerence between
regimes (1,2) and NC. Partial ﬁscal cooperation between countries 1 and 2 leads to
more moderate stabilization policies for all countries and also for the ECB. However,
gains from using a smaller control eﬀort are oﬀset by (in general) more volatile output
gap and price adjustments. Summarizing, this is again the example of internalized
externalities from excessive stabilization policies in the non-cooperative regime.
23Losses multiplied by factor 10
6.
17Figure 3 — Adjustments of controls and output variables for NC and (1,2) regimes
































(a) Non-co-operative regime (NC)


































(b) Partial ﬁscal co-operation (1,2)
I nt h en e x te x a m p l ew es t u d yi nm o r ed e t a i lt h ed i ﬀerence between the SNGE and
the SNE mechanisms. Again we consider the structural asymmetric setting, but also
with the bargaining power asymmetry of the players in the coalitions. It is assumed
that country 3 has always a lower bargaining power when it cooperates with the (an)
other policymaker(s).24 More in detail, country 3 is assumed to have a bargaining
power equal to τ3 = 1
5 i nt h eg r a n dc o a l i t i o nr e g i m e( w h i l et h eo t h e rp l a y e r ss h a r et h e
rest, i.e. each of them has a bargaining power equal to τ1,2,E = (1−1
5)
3 ), country 3’s
bargaining power is assumed to be equal to 1
4 in the ﬁscal cooperation regime (others
3
8), and it is assumed to be equal to 1
3 when this country cooperates with only one of the
other countries (2
3). Of course, the (optimal) losses associated with the non-cooperative
regime and the coalition between country 1 and country 2 are the same as in the previous
case. In this scenario, all the countries are asymmetric through the combination of the
power and shock asymmetries (at least when shock asymmetry occurs). Moreover, power
asymmetry is reﬂected in the ECB loss function where country 3’s weight is assumed to
be σ3 = 1
4 and weights of the other countries are equal: σ1 = σ2 = 3
8, which means that
the ECB is relatively more concerned about the inﬂation and output than the latter
two players. The following structural asymmetries are assumed:25 δ31 = δ32 =0 .4;
ρ31 = ρ32 =0 .6. This set of parameters can be interpreted as a setup where country
3 is relatively small. In such a context we consider the anti-symmetric price shock:
p1(0) = 0.1, p2(0) = 0 ,a n dp3(0) = −0.1.
The resulting losses are described in Table 7. As in the previous example country 3
has by far the highest losses in all regimes, whereas country 2 has the lowest. Country
1 obtains the lowest loss in the partial coalition (1,3),c o u n t r y2a n dt h eE C Bi nt h e
non-cooperative regime, and country 3 in the full coalition C. Note that any coalition
24The bargaining power of a country can be assumed to be an increasing function of its relative size
(e.g. the share of its GDP with respect to the aggregate GDP of the EMU).
25All other parameters as in the BS1.
18containing country 2 is impossible. In fact, it is partial coalition (1,3), which emerges as
the CNE. It is the ﬁrst best choice for country 1 and the second best choice for country
3. Therefore, in this example, the CNE-mechanism is quite eﬀective from the welfare
point of view for countries 1 and 3. However, the SNE-mechanism, in which players
have limited information only to own losses, leads, for the standard order of players
[C1,C2,C3,ECB], to the non-cooperative regime.
Table 7 — Power & Structural Asymmetry26
NC C F (1,2) (1,3) (2,3)
Country 1 22.7909 7.8637 6.9864 11.6036 6.6461 20.6860
Country 2 0.0361 0.5010 0.8137 3.8812 0.3890 7.1981
Country 3 83.9346 19.9487 22.1967 84.7294 21.9766 33.6221
ECB 0.1354 0.1364 1.0285 0.3784 1.4610 0.3340
The SNE-negotiations start with country 1 which proposes the partial coalition (1,3).
Country 3 rejects this proposal and instead proposes the full coalition, as its ﬁrst best
choice. However, this proposal is rejected by country 1, which in this place proposes the
ﬁscal coalition F. But country 2 does not want to belong to any coalition; therefore, when
its turn comes, it rejects F and leaves the negotiation process. There is no other coalition
to create and the ﬁnal outcome is the non-cooperative regime NC.T h i se x a m p l es h o w s
that the SNE-mechanism can lead to regimes which are not eﬃcient from the the point of
view of players who possess the right to make ﬁrst proposals. This deﬁciency comes from
the fact that the SNE-mechanism is adopted in the situation when no perfect information
is available. When players know only own losses and are risk-averse (as assumed) they
commit themselves to follow the SNE-algorithm; however, this mechanism is unable to
always deliver a better outcome than the CNE. The SNGE-mechanism is based on the
same rules as the SNE, but we remove the assumption of imperfect information. When
players know each others’ losses they are able to act strategically and the SNGE-game
shall be solved by backward induction. In other words, at every moment each player takes
into account further consequences of her actions. Therefore, in the example in Table 7
the partial coalition (1,3) is immediately reached by the SNGE-mechanism. It happens
because player 3 does not reject the initial proposal of player 1 as it is obvious, that
regimes C and F can never be reached. Note that because decisions in the SNGE-game
are made strategically this mechanism is to some extent comparable to the FCE-one. In
f a c t ,i nt h i sc a s eC N E=S N G E=F C E=( 1 , 3 ) .
This comparison between the SNE and the SNGE stresses the importance of infor-
mation availability in a monetary union. It is especially signiﬁcant in a structurally
asymmetric setting, which is closer to the real-world situation, and where optimal poli-
cies and the optimal outcomes become more complex. There are three factors which are
crucial in determining the coalitional equilibrium (or equilibria) of the game: an asym-
metry of shocks, a structural asymmetry and resulting ﬁscal and inﬂation spillovers. In
the cases that were analyzed the asymmetry of shocks contributes most to the relative
26Losses multiplied by factor 10
6.
19diﬀerences between losses of players and structural asymmetry plays a secondary role.
It indicates that mechanisms of coordinations in a monetary union need to be developed
even when countries are relatively highly integrated and structurally symmetric, but
when there is still a risk of asymmetric shocks.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper we have studied the institutional design of the coordination of macroeco-
nomic stabilization policies within the EMU and its consequences on macroeconomic
outcomes and policies. We have taken into account both ex-ante and ex-post coordi-
nation. Ex-ante coordination is related to the institutional framework, the coordination
procedure, and the design of policy rules within the E(M)U, whereas ex-post coordina-
tion takes place from the current state of aﬀairs and concerns the actual policy decisions
of the national governments and the ECB.
Numerical simulations in a simpliﬁed three-country monetary union setting illus-
trate the most important aspects of our approach. In our simulations diﬀerent kinds
of spillovers and asymmetries have been considered since ﬁscal policy coordination is
strongly connected with the externalities (ﬁscal spillovers) and asymmetries that are
present in the economy. From the simulations some general and to a large extent robust
conclusions can be drawn when several symmetries (but not all) are assumed.
In the case of a common shock and symmetric countries two main results can be
derived from our model. When countries are relatively highly integrated in terms of
output spillovers, ﬁscal coordination is counterproductive but full policy coordination is
desirable. By contrast, in the case when output spillovers are lower, ﬁscal cooperation
turns out to be optimal. For a country-speciﬁc (asymmetric) shock, ﬁscal coordination
is desirable and full policy coordination is not associated with any extra gain in the
policymakers’ welfare. Our results add new features to the debate between Buti and
Sapir (1998) and Beetsma et al. (2001) on the eﬀects of coordination in the presence of
diﬀerent types of shocks. Fiscal coordination can be deﬁcient in the case of a common
shock (as suggested by Beetsma et al. (2001)). In this situation the coordination among
all policymakers improves the performance. The reason for this is that full cooperation
reduces the tensions between the ECB and the governments in pursuing diﬀerent prior-
ities, and therefore, it reduces the costs of contrasted policies. On the contrary, ﬁscal
cooperation increases such tensions since it increases the clash among the institutions
that pursue diﬀerent priorities. However, when output spillovers are relatively low, ﬁscal
cooperation turns out to be better than full cooperation.
When anti-symmetric shocks are considered, ﬁscal coordination improves the per-
formance by internalizing the traditional negative ﬁscal externalities (as suggested by
Beetsma et al. (2001)) and full policy coordination doesn’t produce further gains in the
policymakers’ welfare since, in this case, there are no further externalities associated
with the separate management of the ﬁscal and monetary policies.
Our approach also shows that it is of crucial importance to consider how coalitions
are formed (ex-ante coordination). Following the recent literature, diﬀerent coalition
20formation mechanisms can be associated with diﬀerent institutional settings where pol-
icymakers act. In fact, it can occur that, even if a cooperative solution assures for
all the policymakers a lower loss than in the case of a non-cooperative solution, it
does not emerge as an equilibrium of the game because of free-rider behaviour which
generally leads to non-cooperative solutions according to the CNE-mechanism (even
if cooperation is Pareto-superior to non-cooperation). In general, mechanisms where
policymakers share more information (as the SNGE-mechanism (hierarchical), and the
FCE-mechanism (farsighted)), are more likely to support cooperative solutions avoiding
free-riding behaviour than the traditional CNE-mechanism, which, however, seems to be
the concept that represents best the current EMU context. It turns out that it is also
possible to design a hierarchical procedure similar to the SNGE, which can be applied
in the case where there is no interchange of information between players. In many ex-
amples the equilibrium obtained with the SNE-mechanism was the same as the SNGE
equilibrium. It is not, however, a general rule, but again indicates that it may be very
proﬁtable to look for proper mechanisms of policy coordination, especially when little
common information is available.
The coordination of economic policies seems to be more diﬃcult when the number
and size of externalities become large. In this case, externalities are often associated
with negative eﬀects irrespective of the kind of shocks or ﬁscal spillovers considered.
The ex-post ﬁscal coordination results are strongly connected with the size and sign
of externalities (ﬁscal spillovers) that are present in the economy. However, results
under considerable asymmetries seem to be less robust, and, therefore, they have to be
interpreted with caution.
A possible extension of the analysis concerns the introduction of outside-monetary-
union countries. This is a crucial issue as currently three EU Countries do not participate
in the EMU and the group of Central and Eastern European Countries entered on the
1st of May, 2004 the EU. It will also allow, among others, to study interactions between
the EU and the USA economies, since signiﬁcant externalities may be present in this
context.
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Reduced form of the model
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, the structural form of the model can be rewritten as:
½
x(t)=−γιniu(t)+ηf(t)+γ ˙ p(t)+δp(t)+ρx(t)
˙ p(t)=ζx(t)+ς ˙ p(t),p(0) = p0
Therefore, by solving the inﬂation equation, ˙ p(t)=( I − ς)
−1 ζx(t), and plugging this
result in the output gap equation, we get: x(t)=−γιniu(t)+ηf(t)+γ (I − ς)
−1 ζx(t)+
δp(t)+ρx(t), from which we obtain the reduced form for the real output gaps:
x(t)=
³
I − γ (I − ς)
−1 ζ − ρ
´−1
(−γιniu(t)+ηf(t)+δp(t))
and for the inﬂation rates:
˙ p(t)=( I − ς)
−1 ζ
³
I − γ (I − ς)





























I − γ (I − ς)





I − γ (I − ς)





I − γ (I − ς)
−1 ζ − ρ
´−1
γιn
A := (I − ς)
−1 ζ
³
I − γ (I − ς)
−1 ζ − ρ
´−1
δ
B := (I − ς)
−1 ζ
³
I − γ (I − ς)
−1 ζ − ρ
´−1
η
N := −(I − ς)
−1 ζ
³
I − γ (I − ς)
−1 ζ − ρ
´−1
γιn
we can rewrite the reduced form equations for real outputs as:

      







where Li is the ith row of matrix L and z|(t): =[ p1(t),p 2(t),...p n(t),f 1(t),f 2(t),...f n(t),i u(t)].






























{z|(t)Miz(t)}e−θ(t−t0)dt, Mi ∈ IR (2n+1)×(2n+1)
where ei ∈ IR 2n+1 is a vector with all entries equal to zero, except for entry i that is
equal to one.
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i∈ ¯ N σiLi
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{z|(t)MECBz(t)}e−θ(t−t0)dt MECB ∈ IR (2n+1)×(2n+1)
23The basic algorithm to derive the game solutions
Similar to the computations in Appendix A of van Aarle et al. (2002a) the algorithm is
described by the following 5 steps.




          


Qi S1i S2i S3i ... S(n−1)i Sni SECBi
S
|












22[i] R3i ... P3(n−2)[i] P3(n−1)[i] P3n[i]

































          


for i ∈ { ¯ N ∪ ECB},w h e r eQi ∈ IR n×n, Sij ∈ IR n×1,w h i l eRij for j ∈ { ¯ N ∪ ECB} and
the other coeﬃcients are scalars.






R11 P11[1] ... P1(n−1)[1] P1n[1]
P
|
nn[2] R22 ... P2(n−1)[i] P2n[i]



















     

−A 000 ... 0
Q1 A| 00 ... 0
Q2 0 A| 0 ... 0
... ... ... ... ... ...
Qn 00 A| ... 0
QECB 000 ... A|





     

B1 B2 ... Bn M
−S11 −S21 ... −Sn1 −SECB1
−S12 −S22 ... −Sn2 −SECB2
... ... ... ... ...
−S1n −S2n ... −Snn −SECBn
−S1ECB −S2ECB ... −SnECB −SECBECB


















... ... ... ... ... ...
S
|










24where Bi is the ith column of matrix B. Then, we can deﬁne the following matrix:
H := H1 + H2G−1H3
4. After computing the eigenstructure of H,t a k en positive eigenvalues and the

















v1 v2 ... vn
¢
:= V ∈ IR n(n+2)×n
from which we can derive the optimal controls:





































   

p =: Fp
where Ki := YiX−1 for i ∈ { ¯ N ∪ ECB}.











p(t) dt and ˙ p(t)=( A +( BN) F)p(t)= :ACLp(t),




where ˜ Li solves the following Lyapunov equation (for i ∈ { ¯ N ∪ ECB}):
A
|









Cooperative solutions are achieved by using the same algorithm but considering joint
optimal losses minimization29.
27If matrix H has more than n positive eigenvalues multiple equilibria arise, whereas if this matrix
has less than n positive eigenvalues no equilibrium exists (for more details see Engwerda (1998)).
28For reasons of convenience, we assume that t0 =0and θ is equal to zero. Assuming θ diﬀerent
from zero, the model could easily be solved following the procedure used in this paper after a simple
transformation of variables, i.e. transforming x(t) into e
− 1




n×n is a diagonal matrix with ones on the main diagonal (see Engwerda et al. (1999), p.263, for
further details).
29For more details see e.g.: van Aarle et al. (2002b) or Engwerda et al. (2002, Appendix B).
25Appendix (cont.)
Two algorithms to calculate coalitional equilibria
Two algorithms are presented which give two diﬀerent ways how coalitions might be
formed. The ﬁrst one is based on Bloch’s (1996) ideas and describes a sequential process
how coalitions might be formed. The second is based on the idea of farsightedness and
describes which coalitions can be ruled out in this situation. It does not determine what
will happen but what possibly can happen. The sequential coalition formation process
(computing the SNE) and the farsighted process (computing the FCE) should mimic the
various cases.
The sequential coalition formation process
a) Sequential Negotiation Equilibrium
The SNE is a structured negotiation process, where players due to limited information
(it is assumed that a player knows only her optimal losses) do not act strategically.
Instead they decide to adopt the following procedure of ﬁnding an equilibrium:
1. Fix a rule of order for the players, which is used to determine the order of moves
in the sequential game of coalition formation.
2. The ﬁrst player starts the game according to the rule of order by considering
the question whether it is rational for her to propose a coalition. To that end





1 is smaller than the cost she infers by forming whatever coalition, player 1 will
propose no coalition and leaves the game. That is, the game continues with step
2. with player 1 playing non-cooperatively and player 2 starting the game.
If there is at least one coalition form where the cost of player 1 is lower than Jr
1
we assume 31 t h a tp l a y e r1w i l lp r o p o s eac o a l i t i o na c c o r d i n gt ot h ef o l l o w i n gr u l e s :
i) Select that coalition where h e rc o s ti sa ss m a l la sp o s s i b l e .
ii) If there is more than one coalition satisfying i), choose that coalition containing
30Notation: ({1} {.}) denotes the case in which player 1 plays non-coperatively, whereas other players
may form any coalitions (but may also play non-cooperatively).
31Note that we assume here that player 1 is risk averse, i.e. it might happen that e.g. in the non-
cooperative case her cost is lower than the minimal cost she can incur by forming any coalition. However,
since she is not able to enforce the non-cooperative solution, we choose to select this deﬁnition of
rationality.
26the most important players.
iii) If there is more than one coalition satisfying ii), select that coalition which
contains the highest number of players.
Rules ii) and iii) say that e.g. the coalition {1,2,3} is preferred above the coalitions
{1,2} and {1,2,4}.
Next proceed with step 3.
3. Verify whether all players in the coalition agree on this coalition according to the
rule of order. That is: player i agrees on this coalition if her cost in this coalition is
smaller or equal than both the cost she incurs by joining any other feasible coalition
and the worst possible outcome if she does not join any feasible coalition. The set
of feasible coalitions is determined by the history of the game. That is, the set
of feasible coalitions, FC, contains only those coalitions which are still realizable
given the history of the game. More formally, verify whether:





holds for all players in the foreseen coalition.
4. If all players agree on the coalition, the coalition is formed and the players leave
the game. The coalition process repeats with the remaining players from step 2.
on.
If not all players agree, the ﬁrst player who disagrees may come up with a coalition
proposal if she did not have this opportunity for this set of feasible coalitions before.
In that case the coalition process repeats from step 2. on. Otherwise, a cycle has
occurred, and the coalition formation process would repeat itself ad inﬁnitum.W e




2. Player 1 may propose:
Jr
1 = max{24.7620 ; 24.7487} = 24.7620.
Player 1 proposes the full coalition C as:
JC1 = min{24.6479, 24.7708, 24.7755} = 24.6479 <J r
1 = 24.7620.
3. Reaction of other players to the proposal of the Player 1:
Player 2 accepts full coalition C,a s :
JC2 = min{min{24.6479, 24.7708, 24.7755}, max{24.7620 ; 24.7487}} = 24.6479.
Player 3 accepts full coalition C,a s :
JC3 = min{min{24.6479, 24.7708, 24.7755}, max{24.7620 ; 24.7487}} = 24.6479.
Player 4 accepts full coalition C,a s :
27JECB = min{min{48.0783}, max{54.1579, 54.5365, 54.5463}} = 48.0783.
Therefore, SNE = C.











ECB leaves  


























In the SNGE we assume that players agree to follow the same rules of coalition
formation but diﬀerently from the SNE they have perfect information about each others’
optimal losses in diﬀerent coalition structures. Therefore, they play a ﬁnite strategic
game, which can be presented in the extensive form and solved by backward induction.
Unfortunately the game tree for the case utilized in this paper of four players and six
possible outcomes of coalition formation has about 4240 decision nodes (depending on a
notation assumed). Therefore we present below a very simple example for three players
and three feasible coalitional outcomes:
28Table A1: Example of SNGE
NC C F
Country 1 56 2
Country 2 43 4
ECB 32 3
The game tree for the order of players [C1,C2,ECB] is presented in Figure A1. Solving
the game with backward induction with the assumption presented in the SNE algorithm
above leads to the outcome F.
¤
The farsighted coalition process
1. Make a preference list for each of the individual players, i.e. for each player deter-
mine which coalition yields the lowest cost, the one-but lowest cost etc.
2. Determine for each player i the minimum cost it can enforce by playing non-





3. Determine for each player i all coalitions for which Ji(.) ≤ Jr
i . Denote this set of
feasible coalitions for each player i by FC(i).
4. Determine all coalitions which are in the intersection of all sets of feasible coalitions.
Call this set the Rational Feasible Coalitions set (RFC).
5. Drop within the set RFC those coalitions which are Pareto dominated by another
coalition. That is, if e.g. both coalitions F and C belong to RFC but C is preferred
by every player above F, the coalition F is dropped from the set RFC.
6. Look for coalitions within this set that satisfy some additional properties as internal




Player 1: C º (2,3) º NC º F º (1,2) = (1,3)
Player 2: C º (1,3) º NC º F º (1,2) = (2,3)
Player 3: C º (1,2) º NC º F º (1,2) = (1,3)
ECB: C º NC º (1,2) = (2,3) = (1,3) º F




3 = max{24.7620, 24.7487} = 24.7620;
Jr
4 = max{ 54.1579, 48.9783, 54.5365, 54.3463} = 54.5365.





5. RFC = {NC,C}
6. NC is Pareto-dominated by C. Hence, FCE = C,F.
¤
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